Abstract. In this paper, we present a lightweight authentication scheme designed to enable mobile devices to achieve robust client-anonymity and computation efficiency. Instead of the heavy encryption and decryption modules of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), we adopt the key agreement operation of ECC as the core technique in the proposed anonymous authentication scheme. This eliminates significant computation cost and thus does not exceed the inherent resource-limitations on mobile devices. Security analyses are conducted to guarantee the robustness of the proposed authentication scheme. Moreover, when we implement our proposed scheme, the demo-system we have named AuthDroid, into the Android system, the implementation results demonstrate a practical execution time, e.g. 149.7 microseconds, on an Android-based smartphone, i.e. HTC ONE X, to complete the whole authentication procedure of AuthDroid.
Introduction
With the universalness of intelligent mobile devices (e.g. android phones, i-phones and tablets), myriad value-added services have been developed to benefit consumers and businesses. As mobile users use their mobile devices, the value-added applications often require a public wireless connection to provide full functionality. To support the smooth and effective running of applications it is necessary to design suitable operating systems for intelligent mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. Among current operating system technologies, iOS [10] and Android [1] are two of the most popular system architectures and lead the way in terms of the successful development of numerous value-added applications for intelligent mobile devices. These two system architectures have stimulated the generation of numerous online application markets all over the world. Recently, a critical challenge for mobile devices revolves around how to resolve the tension between the convenience provided by mobile applications and the data transmission threat to mobile clients. Mobile application services, in general, need to possess specific secure transmission designs. Famous mobile software platforms such as WhatsApp [25] , Line [12], Skype [17] and Facebook [7] , have embedded lightweight authentication schemes to support secure transmission over the Internet. Without appropriate defense mechanisms, the utilization and transmission of user information may be insecure against malicious adversaries on the Internet.
Handheld mobile devices, in general, are embedded with resource-limited hardware components and are restricted by the power saving requirement for device runtime. This limits the ability of a mobile device to run full-fledged security functions, such as real-time antivirus and firewall software connected with the backend application servers. As a result, the properties of computation efficiency (representing the power consumption) need to be carefully investigated when designing new mobile applications or secure communication mechanisms for mobile devices. In addition, mobile applications often interact with sensitive personal data, such as chat records or data retrieved from local sensors such as GPS, cameras, microphones, and accelerometers. Consumers (or business clients) do not always know whether their data is being processed properly or not. Moreover, mobile service applications (or transactions) involving sensitive personal information are becoming more and more common. It is highly risky for consumers if such sensitive data is transmitted within a public network environment without any protection mechanisms in place. From these observations, we believe that a secure communication mechanism with robust data confidentiality and strong privacy protection is a critical requirement for mobile devices.
In this paper, we describe a secure communication protocol for use among mobile devices (or applications) through a trusted third-party. We assume that the data transmission environment is public and insecure, and each legal communication entity intends to negotiate a session key agreement for secure transmissions among numerous mobile devices with robust client privacy and low computation overhead. The primary goal of this scheme is to prevent sensitive personal information from being disclosed during transmission and to facilitate communication between applications by phone users (or external mobile services). Taking into account the need to find a balance between the resource constraint impinging on mobile devices and the desired level of security, we adopt the key agreement property of ECC in the proposed authentication scheme instead of relying on heavy encryption/decryption modules. In addition, we implement a demo-system, called AuthDroid, on the Android system to demonstrate the feasibility and practicability of our proposed authentication scheme.
Related works
As facilities and computers are linked together, primarily via Internet, resources can be easily shared and exploited. Since the authentication protocol was introduced by Lamport [15] , a range of authentication protocols have been developed to ensure legitimate access to resources and secure data exchange. In the following section we discuss research which is the most relevant to our study.
Single-sign on (SSO) is a concept of authentication technology that enables each remote user to access multiple services via a single credential in a distributed computer network. In 2010, Chang and Lee [3] presented a SSO based authentication mechanism for a distributed network environment. Based on their proposed security arguments, the robustness of the mechanism seems to be appropriate, however, two attacks, i.e. a user impersonation attack and a credential recovering attack, can be invoked successfully on Chang and Lee's protocol [23] . Next, Juang et al. [14] proposed a smart card based authenticated key agreement scheme. The authors provided a method to protect user identity during each authentication session. The security of Juang et al.'s mechanism is based on ECC and symmetric cryptosystem. Nevertheless, Sun et al. [18] showed that the security of Juang et al.'s protocol is doubtful and proposed a remedy to eliminate all identified weaknesses. Later, Li et al. [16] In 2012, Wang [24] analyzed the trust between a smart card and card reader. The possibility of user compromise attacks was examined in the situation where an adversary possesses a stolen smart card in conjunction with a compromised user password. The authors then presented important findings under multiple kinds of password based schemes and different attacker types. Namely, the security of both the symmetric key based scheme and the public key HMQV-based scheme is limited, , while the public key ID-based scheme (PSCAb) and the public key based scheme with password validation data at server (PSCAV) are both secure. Chen et al. [6] subsequently proposed a password-based authentication scheme without smart cards; unfortunately, the researches [8] and [13] have proved that Chen et al.'s scheme is not secure. Next, several advancements were made by Tsai et al. in recent years, with two group key agreement protocols [20, 22] being developed for mobile architecture and one password-based authentication scheme [21] being proposed for a multi-server environment. Chang et al. [5] next proposed an authentication scheme to resist against user traceability attack. The authors claimed that their scheme could withstand various attacks such as user impersonation attacks, server counterfeit attacks, replay attacks, and password guessing attacks. However, Chang et al.'s scheme is insecure against server counterfeit attacks, user impersonation attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, their scheme cannot provide user-untraceability. In 2013, Huan et al. [9] identified two specific scenarios for password authentication in distributed systems, i.e. (1) adversaries with pre-computed data stored in a smart card, and (2) adversaries with different data (with respect to different time slots) stored in a smart card. Two attacks were shown to be practicable via implementing attacks on the two authentication schemes, and corresponding countermeasures were proposed.
The proposed authentication scheme
In this section, we demonstrate our proposed authentication scheme, in which a trusted registration center, RC, is required. The server and RC do not require the maintenance of any registration table for the authentication of each communication entity, including the user or the server. In addition, both the user and the server need to store only one set of public parameters, i.e. {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h1(.)} and {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h2(.)}, respectively, published by RC. Note that RC chooses an elliptic curve Ep over a finite field Zp with a large prime p, and three one-way hash functions h(.), h1(.) and h2(.). Then, RC chooses a generator point P with order n, and computes its private key xRC and its public key PRC= xRC×P. Finally, RC publishes and shares {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h1(.)} and {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h2(.)} with the user and the server, individually.
Registration Phase of the service provider Sj: In the registration phase, the server Sj will receive the parameters {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h2(.)} publicized by RC. In addition, the identity, i.e. SIDj, of Sj is public.
Step1. Sj sends his/her identity SIDj to RC via a secure channel.
Step2. Once obtaining SIDj, RC computes h(h(SIDj)||yRC), and sends h(h(SIDj)||yRC) to
SIDj via a secure channel, where yRC is the secret generated by RC.
Step3. Now Sj possesses {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h2(.)} and h(h(SIDj)||yRC).
Registration Phase of the user Ui: In the registration phase, the user's mobile device, such as a tablet or a smart phone, has been configured with public parameters {p, Ep, P, PRC, n, h(.), h1(.)}. When the user Ui wants to register on RC, the following steps are performed.
Step1. Ui inputs his/her password PWi to compute h(PWi||b)
, where b is a random number generated by the user's mobile device. Next, Ui sends his/her identity IDi and h(PWi||b) to RC via a secure channel.
Step2. Upon receiving {IDi, h(PWi||b)}, RC
calculates V=h(h(IDi)||zRC)♁h(PWi||b) and sends V to Ui via a secure channel, where zRC is the secret generated by RC.
Step3. When Ui gets V, Ui stores {V, b} into the user's mobile device.
Pre-computation Phase:
We launch this phase once the session key at the current session is agreed upon successfully. That is, once the session key is established between Ui and Sj, the user's mobile device will generate a new random number N1 and compute eUi=N1×P and cUi=N1×PRC. After that, {eUi, cUi, N1} will be stored in the user's mobile device. Furthermore, the server chooses a random number N3 to compute eSj=N3×P and cSj=N3×PRC, and maintains {eSj, cSj, N3} for the next authentication.
Login Phase ( Fig. 1 ): When Ui wants to access Sj, Ui searches the public identity SIDj of service provider Sj, and inputs his/her identity IDi and password PWi.
Step1. Ui derives h(h(IDi)||zRC) from V♁h(PWi||b)
, and calculates Step3. Once RC receives {C1, eUi, C2, eSj}, RC performs the following equations.
(
, where xRC is stored by RC. (1) and the secret zRC maintained by RC. (4) and the secret yRC stored at RC. (5) and (h(h(SIDj)||yRC)♁N4) derived in (4).
(7) Generate a random number N5. 
Security analyses
In this section, we introduce the security analyses of our proposed authentication scheme. Before doing so, it is important to define the adversary model. In a public communication environment, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker A who controls the communication links and the schedule of protocol events. A has the following abilities: message modification, transmission injection, and protocol event re-scheduling. Mapping to the real world, A can Figure 1 . The proposed authentication scheme be a legitimate user, service provider or system administrator who is legitimate and verified in our system, and possesses the authorization of some system functionalities. On the other hand, there exists another probabilistic polynomial-time attacker A, who is restricted to delivering messages generated from one of the communicating parties to the other one. In the real world, this kind of attacker can be an outsider who does not have the capability to inject or modify the transmitted messages. Note that an insider without entity verification or function authorization can also be an example of this kind of attacker.
In traditional security verification of authentication, the random oracle model is widely used to guarantee protocol robustness by showing that an attacker would require impossible behavior from the oracle or would have to solve some mathematical problem believed to be hard. On the other hand, the famous BAN logic technique is always adopted to ensure the mutual authentication property. In this section, we will first show that our proposed scheme is insecure against malicious attackers under the hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm. Then, we present the mutual authentication of our proposed scheme via the BAN logic technique. Proof. We define a sequence of games starting at the real game G0. In each game, the adversary possesses different advantages for winning the game. Once all the games are analyzed, we then derive the possibility (or probability) of compromising our authentication scheme.
Definition. Let
Game G0. This is the real attack game in the random oracle models. For any game Gn, we define some events as follows. First, event En occurs if b=b′, where b is the binary bit involved in the Test-query, and b′ is the output of the adversary. By this definition, we have Adv ( ) = 2Pr[ 0 ] − 1. If the adversary has not stopped playing the game after qs Send-queries lasting for more than time t, the game is terminated and a random bit b′ will be chosen as the output, where qs and t are predefined upper bounds. And this completes the proof.
Theorem 2.
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees mutual authentication. Proof. The mutual authentication of the proposed authentication scheme is proved via BAN logic [2] . Basic constructs and logic postulates are defined as follows. Note that in this section the symbols P and Q range over principals, X and Y range over statements, and K ranges over encryption keys (or long-term secrets).
Constructs:
 P believes X: The principal P believes that X is true.  P sees X: Someone has sent a message containing X to P, who can read and repeat X (possibly after doing some decryption).  P said X: P has actually sent a message including statement X at the current session of the protocol or before.  P controls X: P has jurisdiction over X, i.e. the principal P is an authority on X and this matter should be trusted.  fresh(X): X has not been sent in a message before the current session of the protocol.
The key K is shared between the principals P and Q.
The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q. Only P and Q may use X to prove their identities to each other.  {X}K: This symbol represents the formula X encrypted or protected under the key K.
Logical postulates:
 Rule 1 (the message-meaning rules): If P believes P   K Q and P sees {X}K, then we postulate P believes Q said X.  Rule 2 (the nonce-verification rule): If P believes fresh(X) and P believes Q said X, then we postulate P believes Q believes X.  Rule 3 (the jurisdiction rule): If P believes Q controls X and P believes Q believes X, then we postulate P believes X.  Rule 4:
a. If P sees (X, Y) then P sees X.
b. If P believes P   X Q and P sees {X}K, then P sees X.  Rule 5: If one part of a formula is fresh, then the entire formula must also be fresh. If P believes fresh(X), then P believes fresh (X, Y).
Assumption:
Before analyzing the authentication scheme, the assumptions are given as follows. Note that all symbols are the same as those in the proposed authentication scheme presented in Section III. The concrete realization of the proposed authentication scheme:
Step 1: Ui  Sj  RC: {C1, eUi, C2, eSj}
Step 2: RC  Sj: {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C4}
Step 3: Sj  Ui: {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C5}
Step 4: Ui  Sj: {C6}
The formal analysis of mutual authentication:
1. Sj sees {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C4}.
Sj believes
, , ↔ (From assumption 2). 3. Sj believes RC said {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C4}
( (1) (8) & (9), Inferred by Rule 1). 11. Ui believes fresh(N1), fresh(N3), fresh(N5) (From assumption 3). 12. Ui believes RC believes {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3}
( (10) 
The final results are as follows.
Sj believes RC believes {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C4} (From (5))
Ui believes {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3} (From (14))
With the four results (5), (7), (12) and (14), and the assumption of the trustworthiness of RC, both the remote user Ui and the service provider Sj can be authenticated by each other via RC. In addition, the session key SK can be perfectly constructed by Ui and Sj as only they can verify C3, C4, C5, and C6 successfully. □
Claim 1:
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees data security and session key security. In the proposed authentication scheme, all transmitted messages {C1, eUi}, {C1, eUi, C2, eSj},{N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C4},{N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C5} and {C6} are well-protected via high-entropy secrets xRC, yRC and zRC chosen by RC. Without knowing these three secrets, attackers cannot obtain any useful information from transmitted ciphertexts. In addition, as some transmitted ciphertexts such as C3, C4, C5 and C6 are involved with the hash function, it is difficult for attackers to derive any secrets such as random numbers and session key values. This is because of the irreversibility of the one way hash function. Moreover, an attacker may eavesdrop eUi, eSj, N5×eUi and N5×eSj, and intend to derive the session key value. However, due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP, the protection of the session key is guaranteed. Therefore, the data confidentiality and session key security can be ensured in the proposed authentication scheme.
Claim 2:
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees user anonymity.
In each session of the proposed authentication scheme, five random numbers N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5 are generated and utilized to randomize the messages transmitted among the user, the service provider and the registration center. Without revealing the real identity in public, all the communication entities only need to know whether the involved partners are legitimate or not. In a more detailed way, in the proposed authentication scheme all the identities are transmitted in cipher format instead of plaintext and these identities will be randomized at each new session. As a result, the proposed authentication scheme can guarantee the property of user anonymity.
Claim 3:
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees known-key security and forward security.
In the proposed authentication scheme, the session key SK=N3×N5×N1×P is involved with three one-time valid random numbers, i.e. N1, N3 and N5, at each session. Even if an attacker can acquire one or more previous session keys, the attacker cannot derive any useful information regarding the currently involved session key from previous session keys. That is, since the current session key is constructed with N1, N3 and N5, it is hard to derive the current session key without knowing these one-time valid numbers N1, N3 and N5. Hence, the proposed authentication scheme can provide known-key security. In addition, once the attacker obtains the long-term secrets xRC, yRC and zRC, the attacker may derive the numbers N2 and N4. Nevertheless, the one-time valid numbers N1, N3 and N5 still cannot be retrieved as they are well-protected in the values eUi and eSj. In other words, under the difficulty of solving the ECDLP problem, we know that these three random numbers N1, N3 and N5 cannot be derived. Therefore, the proposed authentication scheme can ensure forward security.
Claim 4:
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees the non-repudiation property and the resistance to man-in-the-middle based attacks such as server counterfeit attack, user impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack.
An attacker may issue counterfeit messages to deceive the legal communication users or the service providers. However, without the knowledge of three high-entropy secrets xRC, yRC and zRC, and five onetime valid numbers N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5, it is difficult for the attacker to compute legitimate request or response messages such as {C1, eUi}, {C1, eUi, C2, eSj}, {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C4}, {N5×eUi, N5×eSj, C3, C5} and {C6}. Even if the attacker sends a previously eavesdropped message to a victim party, the verification of these old messages will fail. This is because all of these random numbers N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5 have been used at a previous session. In addition, the verification procedures at the registration center side will help the communicating parties to prevent against man-in-the-middle based attacks. In a more detailed way, N2 and N4 can temporarily be represented as the legitimate pseudonyms of the user and the service provider, respectively, instead of revealing the real identities in public. Moreover, the values h(IDi) and h(SIDj) retrieved by the registration center can serve as evidence for each service request. This design will result in man-in-the-middle based attacks always failing at the registration center side. Furthermore, in the case that some service conflicts happen, the maintained evidence will play a useful role in dealing with these troubles. Obviously, the proposed authentication scheme delivers the property of non-repudiation.
Based the above analyses, we present a comparison (i.e. Table 1 ) of our proposed protocol and other relevant schemes. In the next section, we will introduce the implementation on current mobile device to demonstrate the feasibility and practicability of our proposed scheme. 
Implementation
In this section, we introduce the environment setup followed by the implementation results of the proposed authentication scheme. The overview of the implementation environment is shown in Table 2 . In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed authentication scheme, we implemented a demo system, called AuthDroid, which is realized with JAVA and Java Elliptic Curve Cryptography project (JECC) [11] . The client program runs on a HTC ONE X with Android version 4.1.1, and the server program runs on a cloud-based machine, called MyCloud Pro, AMD 7450 Dual-Core 2.4 G, DDR2 1.5 G, Fedora Linux 12. We next report the implementation results. Fig. 2 shows the client program. To initiate a login, the user needs to input his identity, password and fingerprint. Then, the user clicks the "Submit" button, and the client program starts AuthDroid with the server program, as shown in Fig. 3 . Our implementation results show that AuthDroid takes about 149.7 microseconds for the client program to complete the whole authentication procedures of AuthDroid with the server program. We obtained this average time from 200 runs of AuthDroid. As the HTC ONE X is a common smartphone, our implementation reflects the practicability and feasibility of the proposed authentication scheme. 
Conclusion
This paper presents a lightweight authentication scheme for mobile devices. The proposed authentication scheme enjoys the advantages of the convenience of password based authentication and preserves client-privacy protection as well. Formal analyses are demonstrated to promise the security robustness. We further implemented a prototype AuthDroid on a common Android-based smartphone, i.e. HTC ONE X, to show the practicability and feasibility of the proposed authentication scheme. The implementation results present that AuthDroid delivers a good performance on Android 4.1.1, where a short execution time period of 149.7 microseconds is required to mutually agree on a robust session key.
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